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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
WITHOUT BAIL IN NEW MEXICO
by J. MICHAEL NORWOOD* and LARRY S. NOVINS**
In 1979, the New Mexico Legislature passed a joint resolution pro-
posing an amendment to the State's Constitution. The amendment would
expand the power of district court judges to deny bail in certain circum-
stances.' New Mexico's voters approved the amendment and it became
law upon certification of the ballot results in November, 1980.2 The
amendment reads:
All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great
and in situations where bail is specifically prohibited by this section.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
Bail may be denied by the district court for a period of sixty days
after the incarceration of the defendant by an order entered within 7
days after the incarceration, in the following instances:
A. the defendant is accused of a felony and has previously
been convicted of two or more felonies, within the state, which
felonies did not arise from the same transaction or a common
transaction with the case at bar;
B. the defendant is accused of a felony involving the use of a
deadly weapon and has a prior felony conviction, within the state.
The period of incarceration without bail may be extended by any
period of time by which trial is delayed by a motion for a con-
tinuance made by or on behalf of the defendant. An appeal from
an order denying bail shall be given preference over all other
matters .
3
*Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
**Assistant Public Defender; Member, New Mexico Bar.
I. The original New Mexico Constitution, adopted January 21, 1916, contained a provision which
permitted denial of bail in cases of "capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great." N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. This provision was also contained in Clause 9 of the Kearny Bill
of Rights, adopted September 22, 1846. At common law capital offenses were not bailable. See
Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1223, 1225
(1969). Before the amendment under discussion here, cases involving capital offenses were the only
instances in which bail could be denied in New Mexico.
2. The result of the November 4, 1980, election was 157,992 for the amendment and 88.033
against.
3. N.M. Const. art. II, § 13. The amendment revised the original Article II, § 13 of the New
Mexico Constitution by adding all of the language after the first paragraph.
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As a result of this amendment, district court judges may deny bail not
only in capital cases, which was permissible before the amendment, 4 but
also in two other kinds of cases. Section (A) of the amendment provides
for the denial of bail for sixty days to defendants who are accused of
felonies and who have been previously convicted in New Mexico of two
or more felonies.' The previous convictions may not arise from a common
transaction with the case at bar.6 Section (B) permits a judge to deny bail
for sixty days to defendants who are accused of a felony involving the
use of a deadly weapon and who have one prior felony conviction in
New Mexico.7 In the latter circumstance, the amendment does not require
that the prior felony conviction be from a separate transaction than the
one at bar.8 In either instance, the defendant may be held without bail
for only sixty days. 9 After sixty days, if the defendant has not yet been
tried, bail must be set according to New Mexico's statutory criteria.' 0
The amendment also provides that "an appeal from an order denying
bail shall be given preference over all other matters."'" In effect, this
section permits interlocutory appeal from the denial of bail. There could
be three theories behind such an appeal. The first would be a claim that
the trial court judge abused his discretion in denying bail. 2 The second
would be a challenge of the factual determinations made by the judge. 3
The merits of appeals based on these two theories would be decided
according to the facts of the specific cases. The last theory, which involves
more general theoretical considerations, would be for the accused to
challenge the New Mexico bail amendment because it represents an ex-
ercise of state power beyond that allowed by the United States Consti-
tution.
The New Mexico constitutional amendment invites serious and im-
portant questions about how, if at all, the United States Constitution limits
the power of the states to deny bail to persons accused of crimes. These
questions include: (1) what, if any, limits on the denial of bail are imposed
4. See supra note I.
5. N.M. Const. art. I, § 13(A).
6. Id.
7. N.M. Const. art. I, § 13(B).
8. Id.
9. Bail must be set after 60 days unless trial has been delayed longer than 60 days by "a motion
for continuance made by or on behalf of the defendant." N.M. Const. art. I1, § 13(B).
10. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-3-1 to -9 (1978) and N.M. R. Crim. P. 22 for statutory provisions
relating to bail.
11. N.M. Const. art. II, § 13(B).
12. Because the discretion to deny bail in these circumstances is granted by the New Mexico
Constitution, one can assume that the discretionary power is initially absolute. The restrictions, if
any, on this discretionary power must be found in the United States Constitution. These restrictions
are discussed later in this article.
13. The sufficiency of the evidence which forms the basis of findings of fact is a proper subject
of appeal. See State v. Herrera, 90 N.M. 306, 563 P.2d 100 (Ct. App. 1977).
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by the eighth amendment's excessive bail clause; and (2) what, if any,
limits on the denial of bail are imposed by the due process and equal
protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment. This article will ad-
dress those questions.
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE STATE'S
POWER TO DENY BAIL
Only the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution suggests
that the right to bail is subject to protection from excesses of federal
government: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' 4 The excessive
bail clause implies a constitutional concern that a defendant has a right
to reasonable bail.'5 Arguably, the New Mexico amendment is unconsti-
tutional in that it deprives defendants of this right under certain circum-
stances.
There is a threshold inquiry, however, before this analysis applies. The
excessive bail clause provides a limitation to New Mexico's bail amend-
ment only if that clause is applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
A. Applicability to States
Precedent does not give a clear answer to the question of whether the
excessive bail clause applies to the states. 16 To date, no United States
Supreme Court decision has held that it does, although dicta so indicates. 7
In 1979, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Baker v. Mc-
Collan, ' stated: "We, of course, agree with the dissent's quotation from
the statement from Schilb v. Kuebel, that 'the Eighth Amendment's pros-
cription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.' " "
Many federal courts have assumed without question that the bail clause
applies to the states.2" In Hunt v. Roth,2' Judge Lay, of the Eighth Circuit
14. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
15. The precise nature and extent of this right is debatable. The nature and extent of the right to
bail is the subject of discussion later in this article.
16. The Supreme Court held the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment
to be applicable to the states in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
17. See Schilb v. Keubel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
18. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
19. Id. at 144 n. 3 (citation omitted).
20. See United States ex rel. Walter v. Twomey, 484 F.2d 874, 875 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
ex rel. Goodman v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1972); Simon v. Woodson, 454 F.2d 161,
165 (5th Cir. 1972); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710-711 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
965 (1964); Pilkinton v. Circuit Court, 324 F.2d 45, 46 (8th Cir. 1963); Wansley v. Wilkerson, 263
F. Supp. 54, 57 (W.D. Va. 1967).
21. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, sub nom., Murphy v. Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W.
4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982) (No. 80-2165).
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Court of Appeals, stated unequivocally, "the excessive bail clause of the
eighth amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. 22 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hunt, and was expected
to rule on the applicability of the bail clause of the eighth amendment to
the states in that case. The Court, however, vacated the case in March,
1982.23
Although there is not yet any direct United States Supreme Court
precedent which applies the excessive bail clause to the states, the analysis
that the Court has used in considering questions of the application of
other constitutional clauses indicates that it should be. The question turns
on whether the right which the clause creates is "fundamental to the
American scheme of justice." 24 The fourteenth amendment will not permit
states to interfere arbitrarily with such fundamental rights. Justice Doug-
las, writing as Circuit Justice in Carlisle v. Landon25 in 1953, strongly
implied that the right created by the excessive bail clause is a fundamental
right:
[t]here is a constitutional question that lurks in every bail case. The
eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail" shall not be re-
quired. That means ... that a person may not be capriciously held.
Requirement of bail in an amount that staggers the imagination is
obviously a denial of bail. It is the unreasoned denial of bail that
the Constitution condemns. The discretion to hold without bail is not
absolute. If it were, we would have our own model of the police
state which looms on the international horizon as mankind's greatest
modem threat.
26
Justice Douglas considered bail to be so indispensable a part of our system
of justice that a threat to bail is a threat to that system.
Other considerations also militate in favor of finding a fundamental
right to reasonable bail. This right is intimately connected to several
fourteenth amendment guarantees. By its very nature bail is related to
liberty, which is unquestionably a fundamental right. 27 Further, release
on bail is grounded upon the presumption of innocence, which is guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment. 28 Denial of bail results in punishment
of an accused by incarcerating him before he is convicted and makes the
22. 648 F.2d at 1156.
23. Murphy v. Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982).
24. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
25. 73 S.Ct. 1179 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1953).
26. Id. at 1182.
27. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
28. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
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presumption of innocence seem empty.29 Finally, bail facilitates the right
to effective assistance of counsel, which is also guaranteed by the sixth
amendment through the fourteenth.30 Freedom before conviction permits
unhampered preparation of defense by allowing the accused unfettered
access to counsel, witnesses, experts, family, employers, and places.
Thus, the excessive bail clause creates a fundamental right for two
reasons. First, as Justice Douglas argued, to give states discretion to deny
bail would threaten the present system of pretrial release. Second, the
denial of bail has a substantial deleterious impact on other fundamental
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, the eighth
amendment's excessive bail clause is an integral part of a set of protections
offered to a defendant, and is itself a fundamental right.3' The states
should be bound by it through the fourteenth amendment.
B. Meaning of the Eighth Amendment
To determine whether the power to deny bail violates the fundamental
right to bail guaranteed by the eighth amendment, the courts must as-
certain the nature and extent of that right. The Supreme Court has not
made clear the meaning of the bail clause of the eighth amendment. The
language of the clause itself gives little guidance.
There are two principal competing views of its meaning. One view is
that the amendment's language, "excessive bail shall not be required," 32
implies an absolute right to have bail set in all cases, or at least all non-
capital cases.33 The competing view is that the clause gives the state
legislatures authority to make allowance for bail, and the language merely
restrains the judiciary from demanding an unreasonable amount of bail.34
29. In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Court stated:
This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered prep-
aration of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to
conviction....
Id. at 4.
The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-American law, is
not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found
convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the spirit of the procedure is to
enable them to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty.
id. at 7 (concurring opinion).
30. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). For a discussion of the relationship of bail
to the fourteenth amendment, see Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4.
31. See United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1979). "The right to be free from
excessive bail underlies the entire structure of the constitutional rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights." Id. at 393.
32. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
33. See, e.g., Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 484 (D. D.C. 1960).
34. See, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952) (dictum); Mastrian v. Hedman,
326 F.2d 708, 710-11 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
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Under the second view, the eighth amendment does not apply to the
legislatures, which have the power to provide for bail or not.35 Both views
find some authority in the historical development of bail, in logical anal-
ysis, and in judicial interpretation, but neither view clearly prevails.
1) Historical and Logical Analysis of the Eighth Amendment
The language of the bail clause of the eighth amendment is taken from
the English statutory Bill of Rights of 1689.36 The preamble to the English
Bill of Rights suggests a possible reason for inclusion of the clause. The
preamble states: "excessive bail hath been required of persons committed
in criminal cases to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of
the subjects .... , This language indicates that the purpose of the Eng-
lish excessive bail clause was to shore up enforcement of existing rights
to bail, which had been created by Parliament. 38 The English Bill of
Rights clause did not create an absolute right to bail.39
The English Bill of Rights offered protection against excessive bail
amounts only where the Parliament had created the right to bail. This
seems to support the second view of the eighth amendment, that the
excessive bail clause only prohibits unreasonable denial of bail. The
Colonial enactments, by contrast, seemed to grant more expansive bail
rights. New York, in its Charter of Libertyes and Priviledges of 1683,
provided for an absolute right to bail except in treason and felony cases.4°
At the time, all felony cases, as well as cases of treason, were capital
cases, so bail would have been denied for all felonies under the New
York Charter.4 t Similar provisions existed in the Massachussets Body of
35. Under this view, although the legislature has the power to provide for bail or not, bail cannot
be -unreasonably or arbitrarily denied. The nature of this reasonableness requirement is most easily
conceptualized and articulated using the existing framework of due process and equal protection
analyses. That analysis will be explored in the text of this article. In view of the organic nature and
interrelationship of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights it may be that these due process
concepts are also implicitly contained in the eighth amendment.
36. For a more complete discussion of the historical basis of the excessive bail clause, see Foote,
The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (Pt. 1), 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Foote]. See also Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, Part 1, 60 Geo. L. J. 1140 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Meyer]; Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 AIb. L. Rev. 33,
34-66 (1977).
37. 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 42 (1971) [hereinafter cited as I
B. Schwartz].
38. Difficulties in England in securing release on bail led to the adoption of the Petition of Right
of 1628 and to the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. Although these provisions could be
used to force the setting of bail in appropriate circumstances, it did not prevent the setting of bail
at unreasonably high levels. The excessive bail clause of the Bill of Rights of 1689 was designed
to close this loophole. See, Foote, supra note 36, at 983. For a description of English offenses
defined as nonbailable, see Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1156 n. 12 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as
moot, sub nom., Murphy v. Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982) (No. 80-2165).
39. See generally Meyer, supra note 36, at 1151-57, 1180-90.
40. 1 B. Schwartz, supra note 37, at 163.
41. Id.
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Liberties in 1641, in the Pennsylvania Laws of 1682, and in several other
colonies.4 2 In 1787, Congress passed an Ordinance for the Government
of the Northwest Territory, providing that "all persons shall be bailable
unless for capital offenses, where the proof shall be evident or the pre-
sumption great." 43 This line of historical analysis suggests support for
the first view.
In 1789, Congress considered two bail proposals: one for what is now
the eighth amendment; the other, the Judiciary Act," which extended an
absolute right to bail in all but capital cases.45 Both were approved. No
record of debate on the bail provisions of the Judiciary Act exists. Only
in the House did the debates mention the bail amendment:
Each bail provision was enacted as originally proposed. . . There
is no evidence in Madison's speech ...in which he for the first
time revealed the proposed content of the Bill of Rights, that he had
any knowledge of what the Senate committee was about to recom-
mend on the subject of bail. It is equally unlikely that the Senate
committee, which had already been working for two months on the
Judiciary Act and which reported its draft bill only four days after
Madison's speech, was influenced in drafting its bail proposal by
either that speech or by any knowledge that a constitutional amend-
ment on the subject might be enacted at some indefinite time in the
future. Whereas in June [1789] even the desirability of any bill of
rights was uncertain, passage of a judiciary act was recognized as
an immediate necessity. There is, therefore, no evidence in the con-
current consideration of the Bill of Rights and Judiciary Act of any
deliberate congressional intention to exclude a right to bail under
what became the eighth amendment. 4
The two bail measures were independently conceived.47 The presence of
these two bail measures, as well as the history of the English and Colonial
bail provisions, leaves room for both views on the meaning of the eighth
amendment. In sum, an analysis of the historical development of the bail
clause of the eighth amendment yields no clear interpretation of its mean-
ing.48 The only explanation consistent with the history of the Colonies
42. Foote, supra note 36, at 975.
43. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the
River Ohio, July 13, 1787, 1 B. Schwartz, supra note 37, at 400.
44. 1 Stat. 91, §33 (1789).
45. Foote, supra note 36, at 971.
46. Id. at 972.
47. Id.
48. The Congressional record of debates of the Eighth Amendment fairly illustrates the problem
of defining what the bail clause means. The only mention of the clause was by Mr. Livermore, who
remarked that "[tlhe clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no
objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant
by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges?" Foote, supra note 36, at 986 (citing I
Annals of Cong. 754 (1789-91)).
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and English Law is "that the clause was intended to afford protection
against pretrial imprisonment in a broad category of cases." 49 This ex-
planation provides little guidance for how the clause should be read today.
Pure logic cannot solve the dilemma, either. Two arguments support
the first view, that the excessive bail clause creates a right to bail in all
but capital cases. The first argument employs the same kind of analysis
which leads to the conclusion that the right to bail is fundamental. Pretrial
release on bail is basic to the fair administration of justice.50 The second
argument concerns the clear implications of the language of the "excessive
bail" clause.
The language of the eighth amendment prohibits the requirement of
excessive bail. The argument is that the denial of bail is, per se, excessive.
Justice Burton, interpreting the meaning of the eighth amendment in his
dissent in Carlson v. Landon,5 stated, "The Amendment cannot well
mean that, on the one hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail so ex-
cessive in amount as to be unattainable, yet, on the other hand, under
like circumstances, it does not prohibit the denial of bail, which comes
to the same thing." 52 Judge Lay, writing the opinion in Hunt v. Roth,53
observed: "If the eighth amendment has any meaning beyond sheer rhet-
oric, the constitutional prohibition against excessive bail necessarily im-
plies that unreasonable denial of bail is likewise prohibited. Logic defies
any other resolution of the question."" Thus the clear language of the
amendment indicates an absolute right to bail. This raises a question of
how to justify the capital case exception.
The capital case exception under this analysis is primarily justifiable
as historical accident, but may provide further logical argument for the
first view. Only in capital cases does the possibility exist that bail could
not be set high enough that a person would be willing to forfeit it by
49. Foote, supra note 36, at 989.
50. See supra text accompanying notes 19-33. In United States v. Smith, 444 F.2d 61 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 977 (1972), the court stated that "[t]he primary purpose of bail is to
allow an accused person not yet tried to be free of restraint while at the same time insuring that
person's presence at the pending court proceedings." 444 F.2d at 62. See United States v. Beaman,
631 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1980); Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc);
United States v. Wright, 483 F.2d 1068, 1069 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bobrow, 468 F.2d
124, 127 n. 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Forest v. United States, 203 F.2d 83, 84 (8th Cir. 1953); See also
White v. United States, 330 F.2d 811, 814 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964); United
States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (7th Cir. 1926).
51. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
52. Id. at 569.
53. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, sub nom.. Murphy v. Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W.
4254 (U.S. March 2, 1982) (No. 80-2165).
54. 648 F.2d at 1157. This again relies on the notion that absolute denial of bail is per se
unreasonable.
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fleeing before trial. 5 Legislatures enacted statutes denying bail to de-
fendants in capital cases "because it had been thought that most defend-
ants facing a possible death penalty would likely flee regardless of what
bail was set, but that those facing only a possible prison sentence would
not if bail were sufficiently high." 56 In capital cases, therefore, the right
to bail bowed before the requirement of ensuring the defendant's presence
at trial.
In addition to the policy justification outlined above, the capital case
exception to the absolute right to bail isjustifiable as an historical accident.
The eighth amendment affords protection against excessive bail in those
categories of crime which were bailable at the time of its enactment.
Capital crimes were not bailable at the time of the enactment of the eighth
amendment. Thus, the exception for capital cases is consistent with the
view that denial of bail is per se excessive bail.
The historical analysis also suggests an absolute right to bail in non-
capital cases. Capital cases were the only crimes which were non-bailable
at the enactment of the eighth amendment. It is possible to infer, therefore,
that only capital crimes remain non-bailable. The logical extension of
this argument is that the eighth amendment creates an absolute right to
bail in all other categories of crime.
The competing view on the meaning of the eighth amendment is that
the excessive bail clause does not create a right to bail, but only prohibits
excessive bail in cases made bailable by provisions of law. This view
uses historical analysis to argue that the language of the bail provision
does not necessarily imply a right to bail.57 The argument is that the
source of the eighth amendment is the English Bill of Rights. Because
the excessive bail prohibition of the English Bill of Rights did not preclude
Parliament from defining certain offenses as non-bailable, likewise Con-
gress and state legislatures are not so limited. The argument continues,
stating that there is nothing in the language of the eighth amendment
55. Blackstone's Commentaries observed in 1770:
[the accused] must either be committed to prison, or give bail; that is, put in
securities for his appearance, to answer the charge against him. This commitment
therefore being only for safe custody, wherever bail will answer the same intention.
it ought to be taken; as in most of the inferior crimes: but in felonies, and other
offences of a capital nature, no bail can be a security equivalent to the actual
custody of the person. For what is there that a man may not be induced to forfeit,
to save his own life? and what satisfaction or indemnity is it to the public, to
seize the effects of them who have bailed a murderer, if the murderer himself be
suffered to escape with impunity?
4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 293-94 (4th ed. 1770).
56. United States v. Kennedy, 618 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. For a discussion of the argument supporting this view, see Mitchell, Bail Reform and the
ConstitutionalitY of PreTrial Detention, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1223 (1969).
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which expressly creates an absolute right to bail and such language should
not be read into it.
The underpinnings of the argument supporting a limited application of
the excessive bail clause may be further bolstered by anti-federalism
notions. The eighth amendment is in no way intended to interfere with
the states' rights to determine cases where they deem bail to be appro-
priate.
As a logical matter, the two competing historical and logical views of
the eighth amendment are well balanced. Judicial pronouncements con-
cerning which of these views should prevail are equally inconclusive.
2) Judicial Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
The United States Supreme Court has provided little guidance on the
question of whether the bail clause of the eighth amendment guarantees
an absolute right to bail. The Court, while discussing the federal statutory
right to bail in Stack v. Boyle,58 relied on the first of the two views and
seemed to suggest the existence of an absolute constitutional right to bail.
From the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 91, to
the present Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 46(a)(1),
federal law has unequivocally provided that a person arrested for a
non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail. This traditional right
to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of
a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior
to conviction. Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the
presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle,
would lose its meaning.59
Insofar as Stack v. Boyle can be seen as an endorsement of the existence
of a constitutional right to bail, the opinion was severely undercut one
year later. In Carlson v. Landon,6" the Court emphasized the other strand
of historical development and stated:
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill
of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to
accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail
shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.
When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing
was said that indicated any different concept. The Eighth Amendment
has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in
which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal cases
bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed,
the very language of the amendment fails to say all arrests must be
bailable. We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does
58. 342 U.S. I (1951).
59. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
60. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
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not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these
cases.
61
The Carlson opinion is unlikely to be the last word on the subject.
Professor Lawrence Tribe points out that Carlson was decided by a "bare
majority" and that the opinion concerned denying bail to alien Com-
munists pending deportation. 62 The majority indicated that it did not regard
the eighth amendment as clearly applicable to civil proceedings of the
sort involved in Carlson. Further, the case is ambiguous. Carlson referred
to the cases where bail is "proper," yet Professor Tribe noted that this
word is "sufficiently ambiguous to beg the question of whether or not
there is a right to bail." 63 It is not clear from the opinion whether the
Court considered the propriety of bail in certain cases to be a matter for
the legislature to decide, or whether bail is always proper, except in
capital cases. Carlson involved a civil deportation proceeding and is not
sufficiently factually apposite to apply to the question for cases involving
a usual criminal code violation. As Professor Tribe stated, "Given the
majority's emphasis . . . on Congress' special power over resident aliens
in cases touching the national security, the opinion's brief remarks cannot
be said to determine the reach of the excessive bail clause in criminal
cases."' Since Carlson, the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with
the existence of a constitutional right to bail.
Most lower federal courts which have considered the issue whether the
eighth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment
reject the idea of an absolute constitutional right to bail. 65 For example,
61. Id. at 545-46.
62. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 Va. L.
Rev. 371, 403 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Tribe].
63. Id. at 403.
64. Id.
65. See Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964) (per
curiam). Some federal courts have espoused the competing view. The "absolute right to bail" view
of the eighth amendment was adopted by Justice Butler, writing as Circuit Justice in the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926). Justice Butler
found that the language of the bail clause
implies, and therefore safeguards, the right to give bail at least before trial. The
purpose is to prevent the practical denial of bail by fixing the amount so unrea-
sonably high that it cannot be given. The provision forbidding excessive bail
would be futile if magistrates were left free to deny bail.
Id. at 659.
The court also found an absolute right to bail in Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D. D.C.
1960). In Trimble, Judge Holtzoff said the ight to bail was constitutionally protected:
This clause has invariably been construed as guaranteeing the right to bail by
necessary implication. . . .The right to bail is absolute except in capital cases,
no matter how vicious the offense or how unsavory the past record of the defendant
may be. This fundamental privilege is one of the outstanding features of the
personal rights accorded in Anglo-American jurisprudence to those charged with
infractions of the law.
Id. at 484, 485.
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the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mastrian v. Hedman66 noted that
"[t]raditionally and acceptedly, there are offenses of a nature as to which
a state properly may refuse to make provision for a right to bail."
67
Since the Supreme Court did not address the bail question head-on in
Hunt v. Roth,6 8 the courts and commentators will continue to disagree as
to whether the eighth amendment confers any right to bail. If there is a
constitutionally created absolute right to bail in all but capital crimes, the
New Mexico bail provision clearly violates the eighth amendment. If the
other view prevails, and the Court holds that the eighth amendment merely
prevents existing statutory rights to bail from being abused, the New
Mexico bail provision may pass constitutional muster under the eighth
amendment analysis. Under this view, the New Mexico legislature has
the power to create classes of offenses for which bail need not be granted.
Even if the second view ultimately prevails, the New Mexico amendment
may still fall under the fourteenth amendment analysis below.
The second view leaves the eighth amendment with a very restricted
meaning. Under this view, the eighth amendment would apply mostly to
judges who actually set bail and would be concerned with specific bail
amounts. As a way of influencing how states and legislatures provide for
bail for their citizens, the eighth amendment would be meaningless.69
The authors believe that the eighth amendment should not be given such
a narrow interpretation. Its protections cannot be so superficial as to allow
Congress and the states to render it empty by legislative enactment.
II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Even assuming that the eighth amendment permits states to create
classes of offenses for which bail need not be available, it does not
necessarily follow that a state has absolute power to limit bail. The
fourteenth amendment protects other rights as well and in protecting these,
may restrict the denial of bail. The limits of this power are expressed in
the analysis made by Judge Weinfeld writing in United States ex rel.
Covington v. Coparo.7° Judge Weinfeld observed:
However, Congress could, without running afoul of the Eighth
Amendment, also provide, for example, that persons accused of
66. 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
67. 326 F.2d at 710.
68. 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, sub noma., Murphy v. Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W.
4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982) (No. 80-2165). in Hunt the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered,
inter alia, the question of the constitutionality of a Nebraska constitutional amendment, which
provides: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for treason, sexual offenses
involving penetration by force or against the will of the victim, and murder, where the proof is
evident or the presumption great." Neb. Const. art. 1, § 9.
69. See Foote, supra note 36, at 969.
70. 297 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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kidnapping, bank robbery with force and violence, or other serious
non-capital crimes are not entitled to bail as a matter of right. This
Congressional power, of course, is confined by the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, I am of the view that Mr. Justice
Burton, in his dissent in Carlson v. Landon, correctly defined the
scope of the Eighth Amendment to "prohibit . . . federal bail that
is excessive in amount when seen in the light of all traditionally
relevant circumstances. Likewise, it must prohibit unreasonable den-
ial of bail."
And as Congress is free, within constitutional limits, to define the
classes of crimes which are bailable as a matter of right and those
that are not, so, too, may the state legislatures. While the Supreme
Court has not passed upon the direct issue, those federal courts which
have are in accord that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do
not require the state to grant bail in all cases as a matter of right; all
have recognized that a state may constitutionally provide that bail
be granted in some cases as a matter of right and denied in others,
provided that the power is exercised rationally, reasonably and with-
out discrimination. Thus, it is left to the courts to fix the amount of
bail in all cases where it is a matter of right and also in those instances
where the court exercises its discretion favorably; but, under the
Eighth Amendment, where bail is fixed in either instance, it must
not be excessive, and further, where bail is not a matter of right, the
court may not arbitrarily or unreasonably deny bail.7
A state's power to grant or deny bail is limited by the parameters of the
fourteenth amendment.
A. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection
Neither due process nor equal protection required of the states by the
fourteenth amendment can be satisfied unless a state's laws are at the
minimum rationally related to a legitimate state interest.72 Under the
fourteenth amendment, a state may deprive an individual of life, liberty
or property, provided it does so with due process. For rights and interests
classified as "fundamental" by the United States Supreme Court, the
deprivation may be justified only by the state's showing a compelling
state interest. For other, i.e., non-fundamental rights, the state need show
only that the deprivation is "rationally related" to a legitimate state in-
terest. Under the rational basis analysis, a challenge to a state deprivation
will almost always fail.
Equal protection analysis is substantially the same. The state may make
classifications for different treatment when those classifications are ra-
71. Id. at 206.
72. For due process requirements of rational relationship, see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The same requirement is demanded for equal protection analysis. See,
e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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tionally related to a legitimate state interest. For special groups, called
"suspect classifications" by the Supreme Court, a state can justify unequal
treatment only by showing a compelling state interest. The same test is
applied when fundamental rights are denied to certain groups while granted
to others. In order to pass constitutional muster, the actions of the State
of New Mexico relating to the grant or denial of bail must then be at
least rationally related to a legitimate state interest. A powerful argument
can be made that "liberty" under the fourteenth amendment is a funda-
mental right which can be abridged only by a state showing of a com-
pelling state interest.73 Cases discussing the fight to bail and the right to
parole, both of which involve questions of freedom from physical restraint
versus incarceration, have almost invariably analyzed state and federal
acts under the so-called rational basis test." Thus, it appears more likely
that the New Mexico bail provisions will stand or fall on the rational
basis analysis under the fourteenth amendment. Equal protection will be
satisfied if the classifications made are " 'reasonable, not arbitrary, and
[if they] must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all people
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "I'
Two questions then arise. The first is what are the legitimate state
interests which justify the grant or denial of bail to certain individuals,
or individuals charged with certain offenses. The second is how the new
bail provisions relate to those state interests.
Arguably, there are three legitimate purposes in denying pre-trial bail:
(1) protection of court processes, (2) protection of society from dangerous
defendants, and (3) assurance of the defendant's presence at trial. The
rational relationship of the New Mexico Constitution bail provision to
these purposes must be carefully analyzed to determine its constitution-
ality.
1) Protection of Court Processes
The first of the possible purposes behind the amendment, protection
of court processes, is not strong enough to support the provision; nor is
73. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978), employed the compelling state interest
analysis in its examination of the bail statutes of the State of Florida. People v. Olivas, 17 Cal.3d
236, 551 P.2d 375, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866 (1977), concurring with
United States ex rel Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968) held that "liberty" under
the Fourteenth Amendment is a fundamental fight "[almong the rights protected by the Constitution,
next to life itself, none is more basic than liberty." 17 Cal.3d at 247, 551 P.2d at 382, 131 Cal.
Rptr. at 62 (quoting United States ex rel Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8, 16 (D. Conn. 1968)).
74. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) where Justice Blackmun wrote, "But we are not
at all concerned here with any fundamental right to bail. . . . This [Illinois bail scheme where the
state retains 10% of the amount actually posted by the defendant, i.e., 1% of the bail amounti
smacks of administrative detail and procedure and is hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental
right'. I.." ld. at 365.
75. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
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the amendment directed to that purpose. There is no doubt that a court
may revoke bail, once granted, as part of its inherent powers to protect
the integrity of its proceedings from threats by the defendant to witnesses
or jurors.76 The New Mexico Constitutional bail scheme does not add
any new restrictions or expansions to that traditional power. Further,
although the protection of court processes may be a legitimate purpose,
the amendment is not particularly related to that interest. The new bail
scheme deals with the denial of bail before there can have been any
threats. Therefore, with respect to that purpose, the statute is overinclu-
sive.
2) Protection of Society from Dangerous Defendants
The second possible legitimate state interest is the subject of contro-
versy. There is presently debate on the proposition that the "danger to
the community" presented by a defendant may be a legitimate justification
for denial of bail.77 Federal law seems to recognize the principle, at least
as a statutory matter. The federal bail scheme imposed by the Bail Reform
Act of 1966,78 grants an absolute right to bail pending trial to all but
those charged with capital offenses. This is similar to the common law
exception for capital crimes. In the Bail Reform Act, however, the ex-
ception is based on the fear that a person accused of murder might be
dangerous to the community. Capital offense defendants are otherwise
bailable under the same criteria as those already convicted of crimes."
This statutory scheme recognizes elimination of danger to the community
as a legitimate end which justifies pre-trial detention without bail.
The constitutionality of denying pre-trial bail to certain individuals or
classes of individuals based on their "danger to the community" has
never been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. The Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia held that interest to be a legitimate
one in Blunt v. United States.8" Blunt arose when the federal legislation
under the Nixon administration proposed preventive detention. 8' That
proposal was defeated except for a portion applicable only to the District
76. See Hemingway v. Elrod, supra note 66. See also Fernandez v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 642,
683 (1961), (Harlan, Associate Justice); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1962).
77. See, Tribe, supra note 62; Foote, supra note 36; Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process,
113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 38 (1964); Comment, Bail: The Need for Reconsideration, 59 N.W. U. L.
Rev. 678, 691 (1964).
78. 18 U.S.C. §§3146-3156 (1976).
79. It must be noted that there is no constitutional right to bail after the defendant has been
convicted. See United States v. Carbo, 82 S.Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962). In that situation,
bail pending appeal may often, as in federal prosecutions, be denied if the trial court finds that "no
one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger
to any other person or to the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976).
80. 322 A.2d 579 (U.S. App. D.C. 1974).
81. See D.C. Code Encycl. § 23-1322 (West).
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of Columbia.82 It is the only "pure preventive detention" law in the
nation.83 The District of Columbia Code provision allows detention prior
to trial of two kinds of defendants: (1) persons charged with a "dangerous
crime" whose pattern of behavior based on several criteria indicates that
no conditions other than detention will reasonably assure the safety of
the community; and (2) persons charged with violent crimes who are
either released on bail at the time of the most recent crime or were
convicted of violent crimes within ten years immediately preceding the
crime charged.84 The District of Columbia Court upheld that law against
constitutional challenge in Blunt.85 The court specifically held that §23-
1322(a), the section which concerned community safety, was constitu-
tional.86 The court noted that this section embodied the principles enun-
ciated in earlier cases of Carbo v. United States87 and United States v.
Gilbert,88 by allowing the trial court to deny bail in order to protect
witnesses from harm by the defendant.
Thus the Blunt case gives support to the proposition that keeping an
accused felon in jail in order to prevent danger to the community may
serve as a legitimate state purpose. The district court in Blunt went on
to say that the preventive detention statute did not contravene the pre-
sumption of innocence.89 The presumption, the court said, applies only
to the trial itself. To make the presumption apply to the pre-trial bond
situation, the court argued, would "make any detention for inability to
meet conditions of release unconstitutional." 9"
That argument completely ignores the basic underlying rationale of
Stack v. Boyle, which clearly indicates that the presumption of innocence
should apply throughout the trial process. 9' Our legal system has sanctions
calculated to deter outlawed behavior. The system cannot function if the
sanctions are not imposed. Various restraints of liberty, such as pre-trial
detention, may be necessary to insure that a reliable trial will be held
and that sanctions cannot be avoided by flight. Other than this one jus-
tification for pre-trial deprivation of liberty, Professor Tribe noted that a
"person awaiting trial has as great a right to liberty as any other citizen." 92
82. D.C. Code Encycl. §23-1322 (1981).
83. See Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of PreTrial Detention, 55 Va. L. Rev.
1223 (1969).
84. Taylor, Issue and Debate-Pre-Trial Jailing of Dangerous Suspects, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24,
1981, at 104.
85. Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d 579 (U.S. App. D.C. 1974).
86. Id. at 586.
87. 82 S. Ct. 662 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962).
88. 425 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
89. 322 A.2d at 584.
90. Id.
91. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
92. Tribe, supra note 62, at 404.
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Despite the reasoning of the Blunt court, it is difficult to see how pre-
trial detention imposed because of an assumption that an accused may
be dangerous, does not violate the presumption of innocence. Society
has already given the defendant his freedom after his first conviction, so
the assumption of his dangerousness cannot spring from that. It can only
arise from a notion that the accusation of a second felony indicates that
the accused is a repeat offender, and a continuing danger. This rationale,
however, assumes that the accused is guilty of the second offense, and
thus contravenes the presumption of innocence.93 All courts have agreed
that sentence cannot be imposed upon one who has not yet been convicted
of a crime. Indeed, "it would hardly be appropriate for the State to
undertake in the pre-trial detention period programs to rehabilitate a man
still clothed with the presumption of innocence. "'94
The fact that the rationale of preventing danger to the community
violates the presumption of innocence argues forcibly against its recog-
nition as a legitimate state purpose. Because the theory is supported by
some precedent, however, it is gaining support. In a speech given to the
American Bar Association Mid-year Meeting, Chief Justice Burger stated
that "[t]he crucial element of future dangerousness" should be restored
to bail consideration.95 This speech may indicate that the Supreme Court
will eventually recognize the protection of society from a "dangerous"
defendant as a legitimate interest justifying pre-trial denial of the right
to bail.
If the protection of society from dangerous defendants is held to be a
legitimate state purpose, the second question must be asked: whether the
amendment or law is rationally related to that end. For the New Mexico
amendment, the answer is no, both as a matter of substantive due process
and as a matter of equal protection.
The amendment fails because it does not accomplish the purported
purpose of restraining dangerous defendants, at least not for more than
the arbitrary period of sixty days. The amendment has no provision
guaranteeing that a defendant held without bail shall receive an expedited
trial within the prescribed sixty-day period.96 There will be defendants
93. This argument not only refutes the possibility that the protection of society is a legitimate
state purpose of a denial of bail statute, but also demonstrates that such a law is overbroad and
cannot be rationally related to such a purpose. The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia upheld the District of Columbia preventive detention law in United States v. Edwards,
80-401. Nat'l Law J., May 25, 1981, p. 3, col. 1, aff'd, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied,
50 U.S.L.W. 3765 (U.S. March 23, 1982) (No. 81-5017).
94. McGiniss v. Rowyster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973).
95. See 49 U.S.L.W. 2522 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1981) for a synopsis of the Chief Justice's speech to
the American Bar Association Mid-Year Meeting.
96. N.M. Const. art. 11, § 13. The statute which was upheld in Blunt v. United States, 322 A.2d
579 (U.S. App. D.C. 1974), also did not contain the arbitrary 60-day period. See District of Columbia
Preventive Detention Act, § 23-1322(d)(1) (Supp. 1970).
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who have not been tried by the time the state constitution mandates that
they be granted bail. Thus, defendants may be denied bail for sixty days,
then must be granted bail for the time remaining before their trials. Release
after the sixty-day limitation on pre-trial detention makes the bail amend-
ment ineffective as a means of protecting society. The "dangerous" de-
fendant is no less dangerous after sixty days of incarceration. Yet he is
now eligible for bail. The preventive detention aspect of the bail amend-
ment is thus thwarted. It "protects" the community for sixty days from
"dangerous" people with prior New Mexico felony convictions, then it
treats those "dangerous" people exactly the same as all other defendants
are treated. The amendment does not protect society from the dangerous
defendants after sixty days. The bail amendment fails the rational rela-
tionship test as a matter of substantive due process.
The amendment also denies equal protection to those who have prior
New Mexico felony convictions. The amendment makes an arbitrary, and
therefore impermissible, distinction between types of criminal defend-
ants.97 The classification is based on the location of prior convictions.
Under the bail amendment, a person who has committed two non-violent
felonies, gambling offenses for example, may in New Mexico be denied
bail under the amendment. This person cannot rationally be deemed to
be more dangerous to society than a person with five prior armed robbery
convictions from another state. Yet the armed robber, who has exhibited
a history of violent behavior and who would rationally be considered to
be more dangerous than the gambler, is entitled to release on bail. There
is no connection between the situs of conviction and the danger the
accused presents to the community. The bail provision thus fails the equal
protection aspect of the rational relationship test.
Section 1 (B), which allows denial of bail to those with one prior New
Mexico felony who are now charged with a felony involving the use of
a deadly weapon, is unconstitutional for other reasons. Presumably, Sec-
tion (B) was intended to allow detention of dangerous persons, ones who
allegedly showed their dangerousness by carrying deadly weapons, as
reflected in their new charges.9" Because the deadly weapon provision
expressly concerns the new charges, that approach does violence to the
presumption of innocence. For example, a person previously convicted
97. N.M. Const. art. 11, § 13
98. The use of the new charge as part of the rationale of dangerousness raises procedural due
process problems. If danger to the community is a legitimate purpose for pre-trial detention, then
the procedures used for such criteria should be similar to those for civil commitments where the
purpose is the same. The pending charge cannot be the sole basis for a finding that the defendnt
poses a serious enough threat to the community to justify detention. As the Supreme Court held in
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), a person completing a penal sentence is entitled to a full
hearing before he can be institutionalized as dangerous. Surely a person presumed innocent of his
newly charged offense is entitled to the same procedures.
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of a forgery is now charged with an armed robbery. Nothing in the
defendant's past indicates he is dangerous. Under the new bail scheme,
a judge is allowed to deny the accused his liberty for sixty days merely
on the basis of a new charge. Such an approach can only be explained
by admitting that the charges against the defendant are true. If the de-
fendant is truly presumed to be innocent, the justification for his detention
vanishes."
3) Assuring the Presence of Defendant at Trial
Courts have recognized that the states may enact bail laws to further
their legitimate state interests in assuring that defendants appear for their
court proceedings."o The criteria by which bail is fixed must be "based
upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that
defendant."'' Courts have held that assuring the presence of the accused
at trial is the sole governmental interest served by the granting of bail. 1
0 2
The courts agree that states may deny bail completely when it is estab-
lished that no amount of bail will assure the defendant's presence at
trial.' 3 Thus, there can be no question that assuring presence at trial is
a legitimate state purpose.
This purpose cannot support the New Mexico bail amendment, how-
ever. The amendment is not rationally related to the purpose of assuring
the presence of the defendant at trial. The amendment fails this purpose
in many of the same ways it failed in the analysis of the "danger to the
community" purpose. For example, the substantive due process analysis
is the same. The arbitrary sixty-day limitation on the denial of bail means
that the amendment will not ensure the presence of a defendant unless
his trial happens to come up within the sixty days.
The people whom the state apparently believes are high flight risks
will, after sixty days of institutional confinement, be free to flee while
on bail. If the state believes that bail is sufficient to prevent flight after
sixty days, then there is no need for the sixty-day incarceration. The
effect of the amendment is antithetical to the purpose of assuring the
99. This argument also cuts against the use of "dangerousness to the community" as a legitimate
state purpose.
I00. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). In fact, courts have said this is a compelling state
interest. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, sub nom., Murphy v.
Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982), Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978),
Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F. Supp. 53 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
101. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
102. Id.; Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
103. United States ex rel. Covington v. Coparo, 297 F. Supp. 203 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Hemingway
v. Elrod, 60 I11. 2d 74, 322 N.E.2d 837 (1975). See also, State v. Johnson, 61 N.J. 351, 294 A.2d
245 (1972).
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defendant's presence at trial. The amendment thus is not rationally related
to the purpose of assuring the defendant's presence at trial.
The sixty-day provision also works another evil. It exerts a chilling
effect on the exercise of Constitutional rights. 0 A defendant who is denied
bail under the provisions of the bail amendment can be detained longer
if there is a motion for a "continuance made by or on behalf of the
defendant.""°5 A defendant after sixty days of incarceration could very
easily be faced with a decision to ask for a continuance to pursue further
discovery and further prepare for a trial, or get out of jail. His under-
standable thirst for freedom could dictate his foregoing the motion. No
person should be forced to choose between liberty and his other consti-
tutional rights.
The equal protection analysis of the "presence at trial" purpose is also
similar to that employed under the "danger to the community" purpose,
and focuses on the arbitrary distinction between in-state and out-of-state
felons. Section (A) draws a distinction between those charged with a
felony who have two prior felony convictions "within the state" and those
who do not.'° 6 Assuming the felony charged is not a capital offense, a
judge, under Section (A), could deny bail to a lifetime New Mexico
defendant with two prior New Mexico felony convictions. He would have
no discretion to deny bail to a defendant from another state who has
several prior felonies, but had the good fortune to have been convicted
elsewhere. The New Mexican, who has never left the state, is without a
doubt less of a flight risk than the transient out-of-state defendant. Yet,
it is the New Mexican who can be absolutely denied the chance to make
bail. The same result obtains under Section (B) of the amendment. There,
a defendant with an out-of-state felony conviction is eligible for bail in
a non-capital case, but the person with a prior New Mexico felony con-
viction who is charged with a dangerous weapon felony may be denied
bail.
The state constitutional provisions relating to denial of bail violate the
guarantees of the fourteenth amendment no matter what purpose is as-
signed to them. As a matter of substantive due process, the defendant's
fundamental right to liberty far outweighs the purposes of bail amend-
ment, and the amendment does not provide for the least restrictive means
of depriving the defendant of that right. The arbitrary sixty-day limitation
on the denial of bail cannot be rationally related to the state interests.
104. Although the chilling effect may not reach the level of a constitutionally cognizable harm,
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the sixth amendment can be affected.
105. N.M. Const. art. II, § 13(B).
106. N.M. Const. art. II, § 13(A).
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Without such a limitation, however, the deprivation of liberty would be
open-ended and thus intolerable.
As a matter of equal protection, the amendment falls because of the
in-state, out-of-state distinction. The category of in-state felons, allegedly
created to remedy substantive evils, is both underinclusive and overin-
clusive. It is underinclusive in that defendants who pose a flight risk or
are dangerous to the community, but, who do not have prior New Mexico
felony convictions, are not included within the classification. The category
is overinclusive in that it will inevitably swallow those in-state felons
who are not dangerous to the community, and who are not flight risks.
Thus, the New Mexico bail amendment violates the fourteenth amendment
guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection.
4) Least Restrictive Means
Bail, as discussed earlier, is a fundamental right guaranteed by our
constitution. As such, the right to bail can be abridged only by the
Government's showing a compelling need to do so. The state interests
which could compel a denial or abridgment of the right to bail are, as
noted earlier, assurance of the defendant's presence at trial, protection of
court processes and arguably protection of the community. To insure that
the right to bail is not unnecessarily curtailed, the state must use the least
restrictive means to protect its interests.
The New Mexico bail scheme, which allows arbitrary deprivations of
pre-trial liberty, violates the principle that such actions are unjustified
where less restrictive means are available. 1'07 In Covington v. Harris, "8
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, speaking
of civil commitments, recognized the applicability of this principle in
cases of deprivation of bail to those "extraordinary deprivations" of
liberty. A statute sanctioning such a drastic curtailment of the rights of
citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed in order to avoid
deprivations of liberty without due process of law. '09
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substan-
tial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. "0
107. See Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
108. 419 F.2d 617 (1969).
109. Id. at 623.
110. Id. at 623 n. 16.
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The New Mexico bail scheme could, by requiring individual merit de-
terminations, accomplish its interests in a less restrictive manner. Its
failure to provide processes yielding the less restrictive means to accom-
plish its purposes violates the procedural aspect of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
B. Procedural Due Process
An equally serious flaw in the bail provision is its failure to require
any type of individualized determination of the defendant's dangerousness
or flight risk. This failure means that the defendant with prior New Mexico
felony convictions does not receive the procedural due process guaranteed
him by the fourteenth amendment. The New Mexico amendment violates
procedural due process in two ways. First, the amendment creates irre-
buttable presumptions as to a defendant's dangerousness or likelihood of
jumping bail. Second, the amendment cannot pass muster under the Su-
preme Court test for sufficiency of due process.
1) Irrebuttable Presumptions
Under a recent, although seldom-used, analysis of the mid-seventies,
the New Mexico bail scheme must fail because it permits irrebuttable
presumptions. Under the New Mexico bail provision, the defendant is
never given an opportunity to rebut the presumption that he is dangerous
to the community or that he may not remain for his trial. In Vlandis v.
Kline,"' the United States Supreme Court said that "the due process
clause in certain circumstances cannot deny individuals certain rights
based on an irrebuttable presumption which is not necessarily or univer-
sally true in fact."" 2 The courts have applied the doctrine in invalidating
irrebuttable presumptions of nonresidence,"' 3 mandatory pregnancy leaves
for school teachers,' 4 and a provision of the food stamp program." 'S
Reasoning from cases wherein the court has used the irrebuttable pre-
sumption analysis, however, also applies to denial of bail cases. In one
irrebuttable presumption case, Stanley v. Illinois,"6 the Supreme Court
held that the state could not create an irrebuttable presumption that un-
married fathers were unsuitable and neglectful. The Court in Stanley gave
considerable attention to the importance of the family, saying that peti-
111. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
112. Id. at 452.
113. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
114. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
115. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
116. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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tioner's interest in retaining custody of his children is cognizable and
substantial." 7 In Stanley, the aim of the Juvenile Act in question was to
protect "the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor
and the best interests of the community .... " '18 It is clear that the policy
reasons behind the striking of the statute in Stanley are at least as powerful
in cases involving denial of bail. In determining whether an individual
can be permitted to retain his liberty before trial, his interest in liberty
is surely as cognizable and substantial as a father's interest in keeping
custody of his child. As custody questions require individualized deter-
minations, so too should the decision on whether one's liberty is to be
curtailed before he is tried of a charge of which he is presumed innocent.
The legal tests applied in Stanley, as well as the policy considerations,
are as important in a denial of bail case. Assuming the goals of the New
Mexico bail scheme are valid, the question is "to determine whether the
means used to achieve these ends are constitutionally defensible." '"' 9 In
Stanley the Court asked, "l[w]hat is the state interest in separating children
from fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father
is unfit in a particular disputed case. ... ," 20 Here, the court must ask,
what the state interest is in depriving a defendant of his pre-trial liberty
without a hearing to determine if he is a flight risk, or a danger to the
community, or a threat to the integrity of the prosecution against him.
The answer is clear. There is no such state interest.
Lower courts have discussed the irrebuttable presumption analysis in
the context of the denial of bail."'2 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Hunt v. Roth'22 used the irrebuttable presumption analysis to find that
the Nebraska bail provision was unconstitutional. The Nebraska bail
amendment denied bail to all charged with "sexual offenses involving
penetration by force or against the will of the victim, . . . where the
proof is evident or the presumption great. "123 The only way in which the
Nebraska scheme differs from the New Mexico scheme is that in New
Mexico, bail is not automatically denied to those charged as the Nebraska
bail provision required. A New Mexico judge has discretion about whether
to deny bail. This discretion does not cure the procedural due process
problem, however. Nothing in the amendment suggests that the court
117. Id. at 652.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 652 (citing Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894
(1961), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
121. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot, sub nom., Murphy v.
Hunt, 50 U.S.L.W. 4264 (U.S. March 2, 1982).
122. Id.
123. 648 F.2d at 1155. Forcible rape defendants were not allowed to speak once the state dem-
onstrated that this proof was evident or the presumption great. Id.
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must consider evidence about whether the defendant should be granted
bail.
The presence of judicial discretion merely means that the denial of bail
will differ from judge to judge. In New Mexico the judge may arbitrarily
invoke an irrebuttable presumption against the granting of bail at his own
whim, without regard for the dangerousness or risk of flight presented
by the individual. The reasoning of the Eighth Circuit should apply with
equal or greater force in New Mexico. The irrebuttable presumption
created by the New Mexico bail amendment is inconsistent with proce-
dural due process notions. There is no requirement of an individualized
determination of flight risk, danger to the community or danger to the
process of a defendant's impending prosecution.
2) The Mathews Test
The flip side of the conclusion that an irrebuttable presumption violates
due process is the question of what process is due in a given case. In
Mathews v. Eldridge, 124 Justice Powell proposed a three-pronged test to
be employed to determine the sufficiency of due process afforded by a
statute:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 25
Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test to the New Mexico bail scheme
shows that it does not satisfy procedural due process.
The first prong of the test requires an examination of the private interest
affected. The private interest involved in the denial of bail is personal
liberty. An interest in liberty from incarceration is very significant by any
measurement and, in fact, is fundamental.' 26 The Court has long held
that all deprivations of liberty require individualized justification. 127
The second factor of the analysis requires an examination of the pos-
sibility of erroneous deprivation under the procedures used, and a bal-
ancing of possible alternatives. New Mexico judges or magistrates have,
under the bail scheme, absolute unfettered discretion to deny bail to those
accused of felonies who have prior New Mexico felony convictions. The
risk of erroneous deprivation, i.e., denial of bail to those for whom bail
124. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
125. Id. at 335.
126. See, e.g., Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
127. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975).
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should be granted, is not only very likely, but is unavoidable. The judge
is not given any guidelines to determine who, among those with prior
New Mexico felonies, will be granted bail and who will be denied bail.
Because the judge has absolute discretion, he can, consistent with the
New Mexico Constitution, deny bail at his whim, or even for invidious
reasons.
The third prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test concerns governmental
interest, i.e., the burden of implementing required procedures balanced
against the desire to retain those procedures. Satisfaction of this factor
would be furthered by allowing a determination of eligibility for bail
based on the characteristics of the individual defendant. Presently, each
defendant is brought before a judge or magistrate who determines con-
ditions of release. The new bail provisions do not change that. By con-
tinuing this process at that time, the judge could consider the individual
defendant's merits, rather than the mere fact that he may have prior felony
convictions. This consideration would not involve a substantially greater
burden to the administrative process than existed before the new bail
scheme went into effect. The additional time would not pose a significant
administrative burden in view of the fundamental rights being considered.
Due process requires that "deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case." 28 In the case of bail, due process requires that
the hearing contain evidence related to the probability that the accused
will flee or is a danger to the community. A decision based on the number
of the defendant's prior convictions alone does not provide the accused
with the due process right to be heard.
Past crimes would be material [to the risk of flight] if proceedings
incident thereto showed an accused had violated conditions of a bail
or release order. . . . A District Court cannot fairly take past con-
victions into account, as showing tendency to flight, unless he at
least makes inquiry whether in the prior proceedings the accused had
failed to comply with bail, release, or other orders. 
9
The New Mexico bail provision does not require a full hearing before
bail can be denied. Procedural due process is thus violated.
11I. CONCLUSION
When the New Mexico bail amendment is analyzed in light of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution,
128. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
129. United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The court in Alston mentioned
the prior convictions in the context of the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146 to 52 (Supp. IV,
1965-1968). The Act allows consideration of past crimes when setting bail only to the extent the
record may show "he poses little risk of flight."
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serious questions concerning its constitutional validity emerge. If, as the
authors urge, the eighth amendment creates an absolute right to bail in
all but capital offense cases, the New Mexico amendment must fall. Even
if the eighth amendment does not create a complete ban to legislative
power to deny bail, the New Mexico amendment restricts access to bail
unreasonably and arbitrarily.
The New Mexico bail scheme is not rationally related to any permissible
state goal. It does not necessarily apply to those who are most likely to
flee from or disrupt their criminal prosecutions. It does not distinguish
between those who may truly be dangerous and those who are not. It
does not provide a means to prevent flight to avoid prosecution. It does
not provide adequate procedural safeguards to satisfy the requirements
of due process.
What the amendment does is permit judges in New Mexico arbitrarily
to deny people who were previously convicted of felonies of their liberty
merely because they have been convicted before. A fundamental consti-
tutional principle is that no person may be punished until convicted of a
crime. 30 The New Mexico bail provision has nothing to do with the
nature of the prior felonies, only the convictions. The amendment allows
punishment merely because the defendants have been charged with a
crime. The only difference between a person with two felony convictions
who is allowed to enjoy his freedom and one who may be locked up for
sixty days without bail is the fact of a new charge. The one is not
necessarily any more dangerous than the other. Under the New Mexico
bail amendment, the filing of an information or indictment against a
previously convicted New Mexico felon allows the state to label the
individual as dangerous or a flight risk, and automatically deny him his
freedom. The imposition of burdens unconnected with a defendant's in-
dividual tendencies towards flight or danger can only be seen as punish-
ment. The New Mexico bail amendment, which allows punishment before
a conviction, violates the interests spoken for so forcefully in Stack v.
Boyle. 3' The New Mexico bail provision has dealt the presumption of
innocence a severe blow. The "centuries of struggle" to preserve the
presumption of innocence will have been in vain as long as the bail
amendment of the New Mexico Constitution stands.
130. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960)). The principle has been recognized generally. N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S.
288 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisianaexrel. Gremillion v. N.A.A.C.P.,
366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Bell v. Wolfish, 449 U.S. 520
(1979).
131. 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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